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Abstract: 
The relationship between inequlity and democracy has been a subject to many academic 
studies. Yet no rigorous explanation has been offered about the connection between them. 
The present thesis engages in this debate by analyzing the effect of societal inequality on 
the democratic quality of elections. The hypothesis being tested is that the more the 
resources in society are unequally distributed, the greater the incentives and opportunities 
for the incumbent are to use illicit tactics to retain a privileged position. At the same time 
marginalized groups will be more willing to break the democratic norms in order to defend 
their rights better and access more power. The new V-Dem data allows for the first time to 
test these arguments in a comprehensive comparative analysis covering 113 years of 
history for 139 countries. Using a time-series cross-sectional regression model, the study 
tests whether and how social, economic and/or political inequality affects the level of 
electoral misconduct. One contribution of this study is that a new measure for electoral 
fraud is proposed that encompasses all legal and illegal tactics used by competitors to 
distort the electoral outcome. The empirical findings corroborate that on average inequality 
based on social group differences is associated with electoral misconduct. The frequency of 
fraud is higher when the underlying social differences are translated into the political life or 
affect civil liberties access. 
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1 Introduction 
The rising inequality in the world is becoming a central topic of discussion for academic 
scholars, practiocioners and politicians. Global leader meetings like the World Economic 
Forum1 warn that social instability, weak institutions and bloody revolutions are likely an 
outcome of the increasing inequality. Both for developed and developing countries the 
tendency after the 1980s is that the top 1% wealthiest people have increased sharply their 
share of the overall income (Piketty, 2014). In the U.S. for example, the top percentile 
owned around 20% of the total income in 2010 (ibid). Similar facts about unequal 
distribution of power have driven a number of political science studies focused on 
answering important questions like: who really rules; is it possible to be a full democracy in 
conditions of very skewed distribution of social, political and economic resources; also, can 
a democracy develop in such unequal conditions. 
 
Although the relationship between inequlity and democracy has been a central subject of 
many academic studies, no rigorous explanation has been established about the connection 
between the two. By contrast, scholars have found conflicting results.  For example, Ansell 
and Samuels (2010) argue that historically while democratizing, countries have 
experienced increasing inequality. That is because economic development has led to a 
bigger gap between classes, as only certain groups accumulated more wealth leaving the 
larger masses behind. Boix (2003), on the other hand, reasons that democratization is more 
likely in more equal societies, whereas Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) argue that 
democratic transitions tend to happen when societal inequality is at middling levels. 
 
This thesis engages in the debate about the relationship between the social structure and 
democracy by exploring specifically the effect of societal inequality on the election quality. 
An important assumption made is that elections are a key instrument of democratization, 
                                                        
1See the report for the current main Global Risks by 
WEF:http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalRisks_Report_2014.pdf. Comments from world leaders on 
the report http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/1/davos-inequalityeconomicsinstability.html 
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and, therefore, understanding and predicting why electoral competitors would engage in 
fraud has important practical implications for the democratic governance of a country. 
 
In the existing literature the structural conditions underpinning electoral manipulation and 
the precise causal mechanisms leading to misconduct are understudied. The research that 
connects the two phenomena is restricted mainly to case studies, captures only a few 
countries and has a limited time frame. 2 Also, the majority of the studies using inequality as 
a main explanatory variable focus on economic background solely, rather than consider a 
multivariate framework encompassing social, economic and political inequality. 
 
The case study of Nineteenth’ Century Germany by Ziblatt (2009) has very similar 
theoretical assumptions to the one employed in this thesis for a positive relationship 
between societal inequality and incidences of electoral fraud. Ziblatt’s starting point is that 
the unequal distribution of social and economic power generates opportunities for the 
subversion of the democratic institutions that are supposed to isolate politics from pre-
existing resource asymmetries (Ziblatt, 2009:3). In effect, socio-economic inequality can 
impede the “institutionally transformative effect of elections” (ibid). While Ziblatt’s findings 
are both relevant and important; the generalizability of his empirical results may be limited. 
One may legitimately wonder whether the results will hold for an increased time and 
geographical span, and if the measures for the outcome and explanatory variables are 
developed more broadly.3 
 
Therefore, there is a need for further investigation on the relationship between inequality 
and electoral misconduct, which is the research aim of this thesis. The release of the new 
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data (Coppedge et al, 2013) allows for the first time to test 
the derived theoretical assumptions in a larger comparative analysis covering 113 years of 
history for 139 countries.  Such a large sample will give reasons to draw generalizable 
conclusions for the posed research questions. 
                                                        
2See for example the case studies of 19th century Germany (Ziblatt, 2009) and Costa Rica (Lehoucq and 
Molina). 
3Ziblatt’s measure for inequality is focused on difference in the land possession, while fraud is measured 
dichotomously whether elections were disputed or not. 
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In this thesis I argue that when resources in the society are unequally distributed, elections 
as key instrument to power, tend to matter more for the contesters. The incumbent rulers 
have greater incentive and opportunities to use even illegal tactics to retain their privileged 
position.The marginalized groups in turn will be willing to invest more, including to engage 
in fraud, in order to access more power or defend their rights better. However, the 
opportunities and incentives to conduct electoral misconduct are expected to be low at 
extreme levels of inequality. Thus, if power is concentrated in one group, they would not 
need to involve in electoral manipulations, and in the same time the powerless groups 
would not be able to challenge the status quo. More or less equal distribution of power is 
also not predicted to trigger high levels of electoral misconduct. 
 
To test my main theoretical predictions, I utilize the disaggregated character of the V-Dem 
data, and create a new measure for electoral fraud. It encompasses all legal and illegal 
tactics employed by competitors to distort the electoral outcome in their favor, in a way 
that is violating the democratic norms. As main predictor variables for the occurrence of 
electoral misconduct I propose four measures that account for the extent to which social 
and economic discrepancies affect political power distribution and access to civil liberties. 
My results show that inequality based on social group differences is associated with more 
instances of electoral misconduct on average, regardless of the other country’s 
characteristics. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows: first, I discuss relevant theoretical findings from the 
existing literature on democracy, elections and fraud over several different research 
agendas; then the main arguments, research question and hypotheses are outlined. This is 
followed by an introduction and discussion of the data, the methodological strategy 
employed and a presentation of the main findings. Finally, conclusions and policy 
implications are discussed. 
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2 Theoretical framework 
2.1 Democracy, elections and electoral misconduct 
Elections are nearly universal in the contemporary world (Schedler, 2002:38) but scholars 
of political science agree that holding elections is not enough to call a country democratic 
(Schedler, 2002; Diamond, 2002; Lindberg, 2006, 2009). Yet elections are a necessary 
condition for democratic governance as they are the main mechanism that should ensure 
institutions are accountable to citizens (Stokes et al. 1999). Even when autocratic regimes 
conduct polls just to gain more internal or external legitimacy, elections are still important 
as they can introduce uncertainty about the final outcome (Hafner-Burton et al, 2013:155). 
Elections may well serve as critical turning points to an open democratic system (McFaul, 
2002) or lead to “liberalizing electoral outcomes” in authoritarian systems (Howard and 
Roessler, 2006). Democratization becomes possible when the exercise of repeated elections 
itself brings about political liberalization, broader civic engagement, and improved political 
accountability (Lindberg, 2006, 2009; Roessler and Howard, 2006).  
Yet, although elections are spread worldwide and can serve an important democratic 
function, more than half of the current elections in the world violate the democratic 
principles of basic freedom and fairness, and the respect for human rights (Hafner-Burton 
et al, 2013:152). It should be noted that electoral irregularities do not occur only in 
autocratic regimes. Ballot rigging, violence, and collation irregularities occur in established 
democracies as well (Breunig, Goerres 2011; Alvarez et al, 2011). That is one of the reasons 
that electoral fraud has become one of the central themes in the research about democracy. 
2.1.1 What is electoral misconduct? 
Most broadly, electoral fraud includes all tactics that violate the two main criteria for 
democratic elections described by Dahl (1971) as free and fair. “Clean” elections in this 
sense require impartial administration in charge of the conduct and control of the whole 
election process, reasonable and unbiased media coverage, opportunities for a broad 
spectrum of parties to compete, and, for citizens to vote without the threat of intimidation 
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and restrictions (Bermeo, 2010:1125,Elkit and Svensson, 1997:35). In fair elections all 
significant parties accept and respect the election process and its outcome (Pastor, 
1998:160). 
 
Therefore, the whole range of illegal and legal actions (Ziblatt, 2009) that breach 
democratic norms and violate human rights can be considered to be instances of electoral 
misconduct. Specific examples include fraudulent tactics – any unlawful activity before or 
during elections; electoral manipulation – bending the rules or legislation in someone’s 
favour; irregularities – using flawed voting registry; violence used to intimidate voters or 
restrict the access to the polls. In this thesis, I typically use the term electoral misconduct as 
an umbrella term to encompass all types of tactics used by electoral competitors to 
influence the outcome of elections in an unfair way. However, since electoral fraud, 
manipulation and irregularities are terms widely used in the literature to describe the same 
phenomenon, I use them as synonyms. 
2.2 Why do competitors cheat in elections? 
Previous research has looked at different competing explanations for the occurrence of 
fraud, and the debate is ongoing. Naturally, a reason for incumbent rulers to engage in fraud 
and electoral violence is that they fear an unfavourable electoral outcome (Hafner-Burton 
et al, 2013). An incumbent uncertain about victory is more likely to use illegal means in 
order to stay in power than one who feels secure about winning (ibid: 150). In addition, 
fraud is more likely to be deployed by a highly unpopular incumbent ruler also because 
there is less to lose in terms of initial support (Collier and Vicente, 2012:119).  
 
One alternative explanation to the one deployed in this thesis is from authors like Birch 
(2007) and Hicken (2007) who reason that electoral institutions are a mediating factor to 
the relationship between manipulation and level of political competition. They argue that 
fraud is more likely to occur in majoritarian or plural single member district systems than 
in proportional systems because of the more direct, intense, personal competition in a 
winner-takes-all situation.  
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Previously, it has been also argued that opposition parties can learn how to prevent fraud 
when they gain experience and the “democratic quality” of elections improves over time, 
even if the first elections were not free and fair (Lindberg 2006). Critically, an opposition 
capable of mobilizing a strategic coalition that can pose a credible challenge to the 
incumbent in national elections is more likely to be in a position to avert blatantly rigged 
elections (Howard and Roessler, 2006:370). At the same time, such a situation makes the 
incentives for an incumbent to circumvent the fairness of the electoral process even 
stronger. 
 
According to another perspective the distribution of institutional power and the power of 
the imagined is more important than the distribution of wealth and class actors (Bermeo, 
2010:1122). The main motivations to hold fair elections would be the perceptions of cross-
class political leaders that fair elections will be beneficial to their organizations’ interests, 
and the assessment that the citizens will expect clean elections.  
 
Another group of authors have found that socioeconomic structures affect the likelihood of 
holding of free and fair elections. Significant differences in the access to political, economic 
and social resources between groups is often portrayed as one of the main reasons blocking 
the development of and consolidation of democratic institutions (Boix, 2003, Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2006). Since elections are a core practice of democracy (Ziblatt 2009:2), it seems 
reasonable to build on the findings in this existing literature and to expect that 
socioeconomic disparities – inequality – undermine the fairness and freedom of elections 
too.  
2.3 Why inequality should cause electoral fraud? 
All societies exhibit some degree of inequality and certain groups are wealthier and more 
politically powerful than others. If differences in socioeconomic conditions and influence 
are small, they might not have substantial political implications. However, we can expect 
the situation to be aggravated if income and material capital is translated into political 
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power such that some groups dominate the political development. The extreme situation 
occurs when political power is monopolized by a minority social or economic group that 
can shape policies to benefit their interests only, while the other groups are disconnected 
from the political process and their interests are not well represented.  
 
In essence, I predict that when distribution of political, social and economic power is 
skewed both the incumbent ruler and the marginalized groups will have stronger incentives 
to employ even illegal tactics to win an election. First, I will look at the motivation and 
opportunities for the more resourceful to engage in electoral misconduct. Presumably more 
powerful groups (politically, economically and/or socially) would prefer to avoid 
relinquishing their advantage. If they have already achieved unproportional access to 
power winning the next elections is important to not lose that advantage. Therefore, using 
all means possible, including fraud, is justified as the stakes are higher (Lehoucq and Molina 
1999, 2002).  
 
In cases of existing unequal distribution of political power, which happens in autocratic 
regimes, the ruling parties have many opportunities to influence the outcome of elections. 
Politicians in incumbent regimes have asymmetrical access to state resources that they can 
use to their advantage compared to the opposition (Greene 2007; Magaloni 2006). 
Institutions such as courts, electoral management bodies, and prosecutors are more easily 
manipulated to influence the organization, conduction, monitoring and certification of 
elections (Magaloni 2010). For example, the media can be used for propaganda purposes to 
affect public opinion. Bending electoral rules in advantage for the incumbent party in order 
to manipulate and divide the opposition parties is another possibility to keep the 
asymmetrical political power distribution (Lust-Okar 2005).  
 
However, even in non-autocratic regimes, the existence of democratic principles and 
political equality (e.g. universal suffrage) can be effectively weakened by economic 
inequality (Boix 2003, Ziblatt 2009). If money can be used to influence political actors, its 
impact is likely to be greater in more unequal societies (Rosset et al 2013:820).  In this 
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environment, the role of the material base is greater because wealthier citizens will have 
better access to resources to gain political influence including through enhancing their 
performance in elections for example by having more expensive and better designed 
electoral campaigns. Therefore, even under the conditions of formal democratic rules, the 
procedures and outcome of elections are challenged by the in-built asymmetry in resources 
and the possibility to replicate the socioeconomic gaps into the institution of elections 
(Ziblatt 2009:3). For instance, a recent study on U.S. politics showed that economic elites 
and organizations representing business interests are exerting significantly greater impact 
on the outcome policies compared to the independent influence of average citizens and 
mass-based interest groups (Gilens and Page, 2014:4). 
 
Social status can be another source of inequality in terms of distribution of power. Top-level 
positions in political parties and key government institutions can be occupied by groups 
defined by specific social characteristics (race, language, religion, region etc.). Based on the 
common features these groups achieve unity through their common background, interests 
and social interactions (Gilens and Page, 2014:6). Thus, for example authors like Mills 
(1959) argue that historically, politics was shaped largely by elite groups whose status is 
not defined solely by their wealth but other coinciding interests and social characteristics.   
 
In unequal societies, the marginalized groups have more reasons to involve in electoral 
misconduct as well. First argument is that inequality leads to underrepresentation of the 
poor in the political system which effectively leads to poor defence of their preferences 
(Rosset et al 2013:819). Therefore, poorer people can be expected to invest a lot in an 
election if it will lead to guarding their interests better and increasing their share of the 
power. The same argument is valid for social groups that are excluded from the decision-
making process. Rigging elections is similarly rationalized as the only way to protect their 
interests. 
 
Unequal access to civil liberties can be another trigger to violate some of the election rules. 
Since in modern history repressive state institutions were the main violator of civil liberties 
(Møller, Skaaning, 2013:84), protecting those liberties will require a change on the 
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incumbent ruler. Therefore, extreme tactics in election could be easily justified as the only 
way to oust the ruling regime and thus, protect the marginalized groups’ rights. It is 
important to account for civil liberties protection also because its unequal distribution 
might undermine other characteristics of equality. Thus, for example, if private property 
rights are not defended accordingly for a certain social group, the economic wealth they 
have accumulated might be jeopardized by coercive state behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, independent institutions like legislatures, other strong political parties, the 
armed forces or the judiciary can serve as accountability groups and constrain attempts to 
conduct electoral misconduct (Hafner-Burton et al, 2013:154). If perpetrators of fraud, both 
the incumbent and opposition parties, realistically face a response and some kind of penalty 
on part of powerful accountability groups, the motive to engage in fraud decreases (ibid, p. 
156). Yet this causal mechanism works only if the mentioned groups are not significantly 
weaker than the violators, which tends not to be true in societies with much skewed 
distribution of political power. Thus, in closed authoritarian systems, the opposition could 
not rely on impartial reaction from the state apparatus to instances of fraud. In addition, if 
the state institutions are used by the incumbent to protect their own interest in elections, 
the opposition will be discouraged from participating peacefully and lawfully because of the 
low expectations that their votes will be counted fairly. 
 
Another argument why we should expect a relationship between inequality and fraud is 
that less resourceful people can be more vulnerable against perpetrators. Groups with 
lower income also tend to have lower levels of education and knowledge about their rights 
as citizens and how to defend them (Converse, 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 
1995:305). As Converse argues (p.324) the better educated a citizen is, the more 
knowledgeable he/she is about their rights and politics as a whole, and the more they are 
motivated to participate in political activities. This is because formal education brings about 
a stronger interest in politics, a better understanding of the importance of elections, and not 
the least, education nurtures the commitment to being an active citizen (ibid). 
 
13 
 
In addition, the lack of financial resources can be expected to hinder the consolidation and 
organization of poorer groups in practical terms as well. For instance, financing political 
parties and their activities like meetings or public campaigns becomes less viable. We can 
also expect that especially one of the strategies of fraud – vote buying will be more 
widespread in poorer regions, where due to economic difficulties people might accept to 
sell their votes (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2009). An illustration of the last arguments is the 
study on elections in Costa Rica by Molina and Lehoucq (1999). Their findings support the 
hypothesis that the incidences of fraud were concentrated in the poorest, rural and least 
populated areas of the country. The citizens from these regions were not able to defend 
themselves against the violations of electoral law compared to their counterparts from 
richer urban areas. 
2.4 Linear or inverted “U” effect 
Building on the arguments presented so far, the intuition is that the relationship between 
inequality and electoral fraud/irregularities is linear. That is, the larger inequality is, the 
more fraudulent elections will be. Alternatively, we can predict that the probability of fraud 
will be lower at the extreme levels of inequality. If this is true, we would then expect a 
relationship between societal inequality and electoral fraud that looks like an inverted “U”.  
 
Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson predict an inverted “U” relationship in which 
democratization will be possible at middle levels of inequality (2006). Applying this logic to 
the research question examined in this paper, we could expect that at moderate levels of 
inequality, elections will be more significant for all participants, and therefore, the tendency 
for fraud should increase.  Figure 1 helps to visualize the comparison between the two 
predictions for the relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables. 
14 
 
 
The expectation in the second graph is that in the most hegemonic and authoritarian 
regimes, where power is concentrated in one group, electoral manipulation should not be 
necessary because the opposition is too weak to contest the elections. It is more likely that 
rulers choose to engage in fraudulent tactics and repression when they feel insecure in their 
victory in elections (Magaloni 2010, Diamond 2002).  
 
Regarding the opposition, investing in fraud could be justified only if victory is believed to 
be within reach. This is possible only in a system that provides an opportunity to change the 
status quo. Whereas in a rigid hegemonic society, where much of the power is concentrated 
in one group and civil liberties are fundamentally violated, change might be viewed as 
unfeasible. Thus, in a more open and equal system, opposition parties perceive the 
incumbent regime as the key obstacle to achieving their goals. By contrast, in closed 
authoritarian regimes the opportunity for change – elections, does not exist (Howard and 
Roessler, 2006:369) and severe civil liberties restriction might not allow real competition. 
Similarly, when we consider the material background, if the opposition possesses little 
economic resources, financing election campaigns is more difficult. Also, conducting 
electoral fraud requires a certain amount of resources as well, for example for vote buying, 
bribing officials, acquiring weapons to intimidate voters/opponents etc. 
On the other end of the equality spectrum, in a system of more or less equal power 
distribution, the incentives for fraud should be smaller as well. In democratic regimes, 
where political power distribution is relatively equal, groups have accepted the rules of the 
game and the institution of elections. The introduction of free and fair elections 
“institutionalizes uncertainty” (Dahl, 1971). That is, the way democratic institutions are 
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created ensures that the political process is neutral by separating as much as possible 
political outcomes from the pre-existing social structure (Tilly 2007: 117–20, Dahl 1971). In 
addition, if there is no gross inequality by socio-economic groups present, mobilizing 
resources to manipulate the electoral outcome can be expected to be more difficult to 
justify. Similarly, if civil liberties are denied to whole groups, mobilization would be easier. 
2.5 Research question and hypotheses 
The broad research question this thesis aims to answer is whether and how societal 
inequality influences the occurrence of electoral misconduct. Drawing from the theory 
discussed in the previous sections, two hypotheses will be tested to answer the main 
research question. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Societal inequality is positively related to the instances of electoral 
misconduct.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Instances of electoral misconduct are more frequent at moderate levels of 
societal inequality. 
 
While in Hypothesis 1 the relationship between outcome and predictor variables is 
expected to be linear, the second one suggests a relationship that looks like an inverted “U”. 
That is, both at the extreme levels of inequality, with concentration of power in one group, 
and in relatively equal societies, the incentives to use fraudulent tactics will be fewer.  
 
The first two hypotheses will provide evidence regarding the main theoretical questions 
raised in this thesis whether there is a relationship between societal inequality and 
manipulations during elections. The question remains, however, which aspect of equality is 
most detrimental to the process of clean elections. By utilizing the disaggregated character 
of the V-Dem data, I include in my analysis measures that take account for two specific 
types of societal inequality. The last two hypotheses will articulate the more specific 
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arguments that electoral misconduct is caused by inequality based on social or economic 
grounds.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Instances of electoral misconduct are more frequent in societies with 
inequality based on socio-economic position. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Instances of electoral misconduct are more frequent in societies with 
inequality based on social group. 
3 Data and methodology 
The new data on different dimensions of democracy that V-Dem has produced allows 
empirical tests of many theoretical arguments in the field of democracy studies. Below the 
core ideas of the project are reviewed, as well as some of the advantages and disadvantages 
of using V-Dem data for the purposes of testing the above hypotheses. 
The main goal behind the V-Dem project is to produce transparent and measurable 
indicators capturing various aspects of democratic systems and practice4. The data 
collection covers all countries in the world starting from 1900 to the present. The dataset is 
compiled by gathering factual information from existing data sources, and by expert coding 
for questions that require evaluation. The majority of experts are nationals of the country 
they are coding, which is one of the biggest strengths of V-Dem. That is, V-Dem incorporates 
“deep, local knowledge” about the history of a country and by standardized measurement 
matches this knowledge to a global understanding of what democracy is.  
                                                        
4www.v-dem.net 
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3.1 Advantages of using the V-Dem data 
Below is a summary from the V-Dem project description (Coppedge et al 2013), of the main 
features that distinguish the V-Dem data in comparison to other indices5 that motivated my 
decision to choose this dataset instead of other existing measures. 
First, V-Dem seeks to create quantitative measures that capture as precisely as possible the 
different dimensions that make a country more or less democratic. To this aim, V-Dem 
distinguishes among seven main principles of democracy6. Each index is disaggregated into 
a number of constituent component parts, in total almost fifty, and each component is 
measured by several indicators. For example, one of the core components of electoral 
democracy – the quality of elections is assessed by combining 38 different indicators. The 
disaggregated nature of the V-Dem data allows selecting the indicators that capture most 
accurately the theoretical concept of electoral fraud motivated in this thesis. Having many 
disaggregated measures will also allow designing my own indexes and explore 
relationships between specific elements for the purposes of the study– including how 
different aspects of inequality relate to electoral manipulation tactics. In addition, as the V-
Dem coding starts in 1900 for all countries in the world, it is possible to investigate 
systematically the relationship between inequality and electoral misconduct by utilizing 
both variations across time and polities.  
3.2 Potential problems and how they are addressed 
Quantifying phenomena like political equality and electoral misconduct is challenging, 
because it can be argued that these concepts are ‘latent.’  That is, while we can all agree that 
political equality is greater in contemporary Sweden than in 1930s Germany, individuals 
will tend to disagree on the degree to which cases differ and might have different 
understandings of what “inequality” is. In addition, coders’ thresholds vary for where 
meaningful “big shifts” occur on a scale from maximal inequality to non-existent. Different 
individuals may simply have different intuitions of what for example the midpoint between 
                                                        
5The most widely used indices now are Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org) and Polity IV 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). 
6 The seven principles are electoral, liberal, participatory, majoritarian, consensual, deliberative, and egalitarian democracy. 
18 
 
these two extremes look like. This means that the probability they will assign a given 
numerical score to a given case can depend on various individual attributes like education, 
cultural background but also on their interpretation of “inequality” is as a concept. Finally, 
one might say that coders would provide correlated ratings even for different indicators as 
their answers will be influenced by their general perspective on the development of the 
country. 
To address these issues and increase the validity of the data, the aggregation of the V-Dem 
data is done using a statistical measurement model7 designed to test and correct inter-
coder reliability. The V-Dem’s measurement strategy is to build on the ‘Item Response 
Theory’ model, commonly used in educational and psychometric testing.8 Figure 2 below 
illustrates visually how the measurement model works. In essence the measurement model 
is based on the ordinal scores multiple coders provide for a single variable X, country i and 
year t. A single continuous score for each case (question, country, and year) is produced by 
calculating a point estimates on a newly constructed latent scale. The model takes into 
consideration how reliable the individual coders are and what their threshold is to move 
from one category to another for the variable of concern (e.g. Election vote buying) 9.  
 
                                                        
7 The measurement model is designed and implemented by Dan Pemstein, Eitan Tzelgov and Yiting Wang. 
8 In the field of political science IRT is developed by authors like Jackman, 2001; Cox and Poole, 2008 mainly to estimate legislators’ 
ideology using their recorded votes. 
9To get a further intuition regarding the way the model works, consider the way these models are used in education studies. Test 
designers would like to write a questionnaire that would be able to estimate the test taker’s IQ, but also know how good the questions in 
estimating the ‘latent’ concept - intelligence. Thus, the measurement model estimates three parameters. First, the model estimates the IQ 
level for each test taker based on their wrong/correct answers. Second, the model estimates two question level parameters. The first is 
generally called a ‘difficulty’ parameter, and thus reflects the probability that test takers will choose the correct answer. The second 
parameter is named a ‘discrimination’ parameter, and reflects the degree to which a given question provides information on the latent 
concept (IQ) being measured. In this regard, questions with high discrimination parameters are considered to be better. 
V-Dem uses a similar model, in which country experts provide ratings regarding various aspects of democracy. Based on these ratings, 
every case (specifically, country year) is assigned a continuous score on the newly constructed latent scale, and raters are assigned 
discrimination parameters (essentially, how good a coder is) and difficulty parameters (i.e thresholds between different levels of the 
variable).  
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Figure 2. Measurement model structure 
 
Lastly, one might assume that coders from country A are different from coders from 
country B. In order to ameliorate this problem, V-Dem uses 'bridge coders'. These are 
coders that code multiple countries and the information they provide is essential to 
guarantee cross-national comparability. By introducing a number of control variables and 
performing a series of robustness checks I seek to further address some of the issues 
mentioned above. 
3.3 Operationalization of the dependent variable: electoral misconduct 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how structural conditions in society affect the tactics 
electoral competitors employ during elections. Specifically, the outcome variable on which 
the analysis focuses is electoral misconduct.  
 
There is no consensus in the literature on a measure for fraudulent tactics used during 
elections. Similarly to measuring corruption, quantifying electoral manipulation as a 
shadow activity is particularly difficult because the subjects of fraud want to remain hidden 
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and are unwilling to reveal their actions.  Scholars have used measures such as the number 
of filed petitions to nullify elections and the number of contestations (Ziblatt, 2009, 
Lehoucq and Molina, 1999) to approximate the level of electoral misconduct. However, 
accusations of fraud are often used by opposition parties to justify their defeats and in 
order to try to reduce the political legitimacy of the winners (Lehoucq and Molina, 1999, 
Lindberg 2006) putting a question-mark to the validity of such measures. 
To create a measure for electoral misconduct, I have selected ten V-Dem indicators that 
capture different aspects of irregularities conducted during national elections. They are 
presented in brief in Table 1 with the main tactics they account for. The last column 
summarizes considerations from the existing literature on how each tactic affects the 
quality of elections, and this is the justification for the inclusion in the measure10. 
 
Table 1: Measuring Electoral Misconduct 
 Variable name Main tactics included in the measure How does the tactic affect the 
quality of elections 
1 Election vote-
buying 
Distributing money or gifts to influence 
decision to vote or whom to vote for 
Violates the freedom of choice in 
elections (Schedler 2010:40, Ziblatt 
2009); affects particularly the 
economically disadvantaged 
2 Elections 
multiparty 
A few parties are legally allowed to stand 
for elections but they are all strongly 
influenced by the incumbent party 
Elections are not meaningful unless 
citizens can choose between 
substantially different options; 
freedom of choice is restricted 
otherwise (Schedler 2010:40) 
3 Election voter 
registry 
Intentionally manipulation of the registry 
by adding/deleting names of citizens 
entitled to vote 
Manipulations of the registry and 
its flaws might lead to 
disenfranchisement of voters, 
double-voting and impersonation 
(Coppedge et al, 2013) 
4 Government 
intimidation 
Violent harassment and intimidation of the 
opposition by the government or its agents  
Voters or opposition parties could 
be intimidated and discouraged to 
vote or continue their participation 
in elections (Collier, Vicente; 2010) 
5 Other electoral 
violence 
Election-related violence conducted from 
and between citizens/non-governmental 
agents 
Intimidation of citizens/parties, at 
the extreme levels, could lead to 
taking over power by violence 
(Collier, Vicente; 2010) 
                                                        
10 The variable names, and the description of the tactics and their effects are drawing from the V-Dem 
Codebook (Coppedge, Gerring, Teorell, Lindberg; 2013) 
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6 EMB Autonomy 
restricted 
 EMB is prevented from applying election 
laws and administrative rules impartially 
EMB is a central institution 
exercising constraints on the 
opportunities for fraud(Hafner-
Burton et al, 2013) 
7 Free campaign 
media 
Access to media and campaign coverage is 
restricted to the ruling parties and 
candidates only 
Citizens should have access to 
information and learn about 
available political alternatives; free 
elections include freedom of 
opinion formation (Schedler, 
2002:39) 
8 Eligibility 
restricted 
Legal provisions prevent the eligibility of 
candidates for national office restricted by 
ethnicity, race, religion, or language 
Equal opportunities on individual 
level to stand for office makes 
elections “fair” 
9 Other voting 
irregularities 
Other intentional irregularities: e.g. using 
double identities, intentional lack of voting 
materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of 
votes etc. 
Intentional irregularities might 
distort the will of the electorate and 
steal the purpose of elections 
10 Elections free and 
fair 
Comprehensive measure of the overall 
election process encompassing all tactics 
compromising elections 
Impairs the opportunity to 
effectively exercise the democratic 
right to select the rulers 
 
Eight of the ten indicators focus on manipulations and irregularities conducted right before 
or during national elections. The two indicators measuring institutionally designed factors 
that might affect the quality of elections are elections multiparty and eligibility restricted. 
After selecting the relevant aspects of electoral misconduct, my goal is to transform these 
variables into a general index of the underlying latent variable. To this aim, I use factor 
analysis to reduce the ten indicators quantifying different aspects of electoral misconduct 
from Table 1 to one single indicator.  The scores from the factor analysis11 are applied in the 
regression analysis as dependent variable, retaining essentially the variation from the 
original data (Rummel, 1967).12 Lower values for that index correspond to more incidences 
of fraud while higher values will mean “cleaner” elections. 13 
 
                                                        
11Factor analysis output is presented in the Appendix, Table A.1. 
12This is done with the following steps (Rummel, 1967): first, the loadings from the factor analysis matrix determine whether there is a pattern in 
the variables variation. Every constituting variable is weighted according to its involvement in the pattern and, hence, variables with less 
involvement in the pattern will have lower weight in the final score and respectively, variables with more involvement in the pattern will have 
bigger weight. Subsequently, the initial score from the data (country-year-variable) is multiplied by the weight of that variable in the pattern. 
The score derived for all variables is then summed to produce a final factor score on electoral fraud for each country and year.  
13 The exact formulation of the indicators questions and answers is presented in the Appendix. 
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3.4 Operationalization of the independent variable: inequality 
The explanatory variables in my analysis account for levels of inequality in a country. In the 
existing literature inequality is typically perceived as a homogenous phenomenon that can 
be measured by a single variable – often this is Gini coefficient. As it was mentioned, the 
previous study on the relationship between inequality and electoral fraud uses the 
difference in possession of land – a major source of wealth and power in the past, as a proxy 
for inequality. The unequal distribution of land can undermine the fairness of elections 
because landlords were able to influence electoral outcomes by using their social power 
(Baland and Robinson, 2006). Ziblatt extends that argument by adding that land elites were 
also able to exercise control over local institutions, thus acquiring the institutional base and 
coercive resources to rig the election conduct and outcome (2009:9). 
 
Ziblatt’s measure of inequality– differences in the holding of lands provides a good 
mediation of the distribution of wealth and power in the nineteenth century Germany when 
land was a key source of political influence. However, the importance of landholding for the 
distribution of wealth and power has changed significantly over time. In addition, inequality 
has other important dimensions that can be expected to affect the exercise of democratic 
rights differently. Since it is possible that various aspects of inequality affect the incidence 
of electoral misconduct, a multivariate framework is used in the following analysis. This 
makes it possible to assess the degree to which different aspects of inequality affect the 
dependent variable. 
 
Specifically, I am interested in the extent to which social group and economic differences 
are detrimental to other key characteristics of a society – political power distribution and 
access to civil liberties. Figure 3 visualizes the aspects of inequality as they are specified 
with the main independent variables of interest, extracted from the V-Dem dataset. 
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Figure 3.Aspects of societal inequality as captured by the main explanatory variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Four indicators capturing different levels of social, political and economic inequality are 
available in the V-Dem data. The first two indicators measure whether political power is 
distributed according to socioeconomic position or social groups. Specifically, they focus on 
the extent to which wealth and the class structure are transformed into political power. A 
social group is termed as individuals that identify themselves as having common ethnicity, 
caste, language, race, religion, come from the same region or define themselves with some 
combination of the mentioned (Coppedge et al, 2013)14. 
 
The third and fourth V-Dem indicators measure whether all social and socio-economic 
groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties. That is, whether all people have equal access to 
justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, freedom from forced labor (ibid).  
 
Lower values for the inequality variables describe a gross unequal distribution of resources, 
while the highest values correspond to more or less equal societies. These four indicators 
together capture in a relative comprehensive way the different aspects of inequality in a society. 
Analyzing them will give a sense of whether societal inequality in general affects the instances 
                                                        
14 The exact formulation of the indicators questions and answers is presented in the Appendix. 
Political power 
distributed by: 
Civil liberties 
restricted to: 
Socioeconomic 
groups 
Social groups 
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of electoral misconduct, while the individual indicators included in the analysis will allow more 
fine-grained tests of how exactly the mechanism works. 
3.5 Model specification 
To test the assumed hypotheses on the relationship between societal inequality and the 
freedom and fairness of elections time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression model is 
applied, using ordinary least square (OLS) estimation procedure and has the following 
form: 
                             (1) 
In equation (1) the measure βk is the predicted effect that one unit of change in k number of 
independent variables Xi,l. will produce in the dependent variable Yi,l. The equation also 
includes a common intercept β0 and an individual error term ei, l. The observations are 
indexed by unit (country) “i” and time “l”, which signifies election year in my models. 
 
There are three important assumptions that need to be considered when applying OLS 
procedure with TSCS model. First, we have to take into account that the observations in 
TSCS are yearly observations for the same political units. This might violate the OLS 
assumption that the observations are independent. The problem that should be considered 
is that there is high probability that the independent variables in equation (1) are 
endogenous, or in other words correlated with the error term in εi. Secondly, all errors 
should have the same variance across units (homoscedasticity assumption). If the errors 
are not “spherical” in this sense, the standard errors in the model will be miscalculated 
affecting the significance of the results (Beck, Katz, 1995:4). The third issue to be taken into 
account when applying regression analysis is the direction of causality or the claim that one 
variable causes changes in the other. 
 
In addition it should be noted that the variables included in vector X (independent 
variables) should not be correlated with each other. Otherwise they will cause 
multicollinearity problem, and produce larger standard errors which will make it difficult to 
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reject the null hypothesis. If this is the case, I should consider excluding one of the collinear 
variables. 
 
In the literature there are a number of recommendations how to deal with violations of the 
described assumptions and achieve a more reliable model. 
 
One of the methods widely applied in social sciences is to use country fixed effects (Greene, 
2008:183). In order to make sure that the regression results are not caused by constant 
characteristics of the countries not included in the model such as geography, institutions 
and population size and in order to isolate the time-variant effects we are interested to 
measure. When we use fixed effects, we assume that we need to control for the individual 
time-invariant specifics of a country that might bias or impact the outcome or explanatory 
variables. 
 
Lagging the independent and dependent variables is another adjustment recommended to 
overcome the endogenity bias and autocorrelation (Beck, 2001; Keele and Kelly 2004). In 
effect, lagged dependent variable serves as a proximate test for causality direction and also, 
controls for “history” or in other words is a proxy for the effect of other omitted variables in 
the model. These two specifications modify the model in the following way: 
 
 Yi, l= β0+βYi,l-1+ βkXki,l-1 + γ i+         (2) 
 
Where γ i specifies the inclusion of country fixed effects and the design l-1 denotes the 
lagging of the independent and dependent variables. For electoral misconduct, the lag will 
measure the levels of fraud in the previous elections, and for the explanatory variables – the 
levels of inequality one year before the election. 
 
Theoretically, the lagging of the main variables also holds ground, since in reality the 
behavior of actors is affected by history. Thus, we could specify that equation (2) measures 
the current level of electoral fraud as a function of past levels of fraud modified by the 
perceived information on levels of inequality. The lagging of the dependent variable and 
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independent variables consequently adds dynamic interpretation to the model (Keele and 
Kelly 2004:5).  
 
The lagging of the main variables, however, might create side effects since they will be 
highly collinear with the original variables, leading to imprecise estimates of the betas 
(Keele and Kelly 2004:6). While Keele and Kelly show that the bias is not serious as long as 
panel sizes are large enough, the inclusion of lags can artificially reduce the explanatory 
power of the theoretically motivated variables.  To control for such bias, I will estimate and 
compare both models with and without a lag. 
 
The last modification advised by the methodological literature aims to overcome 
heteroskedasticity and non-spherical errors, by applying panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSEs) (Beck 1995, 2001). The advantage of this method is that it reflects closely the 
variability of the βcoefficients produced by OLS without distorting the data while correcting 
for problems that affect the measure of the standard errors (Beck 2001:13). The final model 
as described with the above specifications can be represented in the following way: 
                                                                                                                      
                                                    
                                                            
                                      
                                                
                                                        
WhereXji,l is a vector including all control variables to be introduced in the model. 
 
The interpretation of equation (3) is that the level of electoral misconduct depends on the 
levels of different aspects of societal inequality all other factors held equal. The results of 
this regression will give us arguments to support or reject the four specified hypotheses. 
The discussion of statistical significance and coefficients results estimates will allow further 
exploration of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
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3.5.1 Control variables 
When analyzing the effect of inequality on electoral misconduct, it is important to consider 
alternative explanations that may affect the behavior of electoral competitors. The 
introduction of control variable will thus reduce the likelihood of spurious findings on the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. To that aim, based on 
previous findings in the literature I supplemented the main model by adding other 
important factors that might affect the occurrence of electoral misconduct.  
 
The first control variable is ethnic fractionalization since internal divisions in a country can 
affect the likelihood of violence. The variable chosen uses a definition of ethnicity involving 
a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics collected by Alesina et al (2003).  
 
In addition, control is introduced for a standard measure for wealth in a country to make 
sure that the changes in the dependent variable are not result of differences in economic 
development across the countries. The indicator GDP/PPP is extracted from the World 
Bank Development Indicators and measures the gross domestic product using purchasing 
power parity rates (World Bank WDI, 2013). 
 
A third control variable is an estimate of Gini-index of inequality. The Gini coefficient varies 
from minimal value 0 which corresponds to the theoretical possibility for perfectly equal 
income distribution in the society to maximum value 100 in which case the society’s total 
income belongs to only one person (Teorell et al, 2013). The indicator comes from the 
United Nations University's World Income Inequality Database (Solt 2008), and is 
supplemented with the data on income inequality gathered by Ansell and Samuels mainly 
for years before 1960 (2010). Controlling for Gini coefficient tests for the theoretical 
assumption that economic inequality is the only motive to conduct fraud. 
 
Since previous research (see for example Birch, 2007; Hicken, 2007) has found that the type 
of electoral system affects the dynamics of elections significantly, a control for this factor is 
introduced. The measure is extracted from QoG database and uses Golder's (2005) 
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Democratic Electoral Systems dataset to identify the type of electoral system – majoritarian, 
proportional or mixed. 
 
Lastly, I will control for regime type to make sure that it is not the specific characteristics of 
democratic regimes only that prevent fraud (Lindberg, 2006; Howard and Roessler, 2006).  
To that aim, I will use the mean score from Freedom house and Polity for democracy 
(fh_ipolity2) designed by Teorell and Hadenius (2005)15. 
4 Empirical analysis 
To test the observable implications of my arguments for the relationship between 
inequality and electoral misconduct, I perform regression analysis, using data on elections 
and inequality for 139 countries16 for 2453 election years, held from 1900 until 2012. 
Before testing my main models, I discuss the preliminary analysis of my data. Table 2 below 
provides summary information of the descriptive statistics for all variables employed in the 
subsequent analysis. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the variables used 
Variable name N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Electoral misconduct 2453 0.08 0.96 -2.22 2.45 
Civil liberties equality for social groups 2570 0.31 0.85 -1.67 1.87 
Civil liberties equality for social class 2496 0.27 0.84 -1.89 2 
Political power by socioeconomic 
position 
2507 0.16 0.80 -1.74 1.94 
Political power by social group 2467 0.43 0.74 -1.48 2.09 
Ethnic fractionalization 1639 0.43 0.27 0 0.93 
Gini coefficient 1781 26.58 19.61 0.28 71.33 
GDP per capita, PPP 951 8489.61 9413.24 207.05 47626.3 
Regime type (FH_polity) 1200 5.95 3.18 0.25 10 
Electoral system 931 1.82 0.65 1 3 
 
                                                        
15 The exact formulation of the indicators questions and answers is presented in the Appendix. 
16 Table A.2 in the Appendix lists the countries included in the analysis. 
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The first variable in Table 2 is the dependent variable – Electoral misconduct, derived using 
factor analysis; followed by the four main explanatory V-Dem variables, and lastly, the 
control variables are presented. 
 
The dependent variable is continuous and displays a more or less normal distribution 
(Graph A.1 in the Appendix). Although it shows a slight negative skew and lightly tailed 
distribution (Table A.3 in the Appendix), the distribution of the observations are close to 
normal. In addition, the check for multicollinearity problem show that the independent 
variables are not a linear function of one another as the VIF-values (variance inflation 
factor) in Table A.5 in the Appendix demonstrate. 
 
However, Pearson correlation coefficient17 shows that the control variable measuring 
regime type (combined Freedom House and Polity IV measure) is highly correlated with the 
dependent variable (0.88). This signals that the variance of the left and right hand side 
variables is explained by similar factors. In essence, this means that the effect of regime 
type on electoral misconduct is correlated with the error term, and in the regression 
estimates this might lead to biased beta coefficients. To avoid the occurring endogeneity 
problem and still make sure that the type of regime is not the most important factor 
affecting electoral misconduct, I will re-estimate the main models and exclude from the data 
countries with extreme levels for the variable measuring regime type in the robustness 
checks. Thus, election years for full democracies with scores higher than 9, and full 
autocracies with scores lower than 2, will be excluded from the regression.18 
4.1 Regression analysis 
Table 3 reports the estimates of the models described in the previous sections.The 
discussion of the statistical significance and estimated coefficients from the regression will 
provide arguments to support or reject the hypotheses presented above. 
                                                        
17 Pearson correlation coefficient table is attached in the Appendix, Table A.4. The remaining variables do not show strong 
correlation between each other. 
18 Similar method is used by Howard and Rossler (2006:368) for their purposes. They are excluding closed authoritarian 
systems (lowest scores) and full electoral and liberal democracies (highest scores) to get data only on competitive 
authoritarian regimes. 
  
Table 3. Regression estimates of the effect of Societal Inequality on Electoral Misconduct 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variable name V-Dem Ind.V LDV LDV PCSE FE 
LDV, Control 
variables, 
PCSE 
LDV, Control 
variables, PCSE, 
FE 
Power distributed by socioeconomic position 0.137*** 0.005 0.045 -0.029 -0.002 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
Power distributed by social group 0.368*** 0.093*** 0.200*** 0.067 0.382*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.09) 
Social group equality in respect for  0.272*** 0.052** 0.155*** 0.069 0.363*** 
civil liberties (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.09) 
Social class equality in respect for 0.046 0.005 0.032 0.044 -0.002 
 civil liberties (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.12) 
Electoral misconduct lagged 
 
0.874*** 0.721*** 0.680*** 0.270*** 
  
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
   
0.016 . 
  
   
(0.07) . 
Gini coefficient 
   
0.001 -0.011* 
  
   
(0) (0) 
GDP per Capita, PPP  
   
0.000 0.000 
(Constant International USD) 
   
(0) (0) 
Electoral system 
   
0.068** 0.188*** 
        (0.02) (0.05) 
Constant -0.254*** -0.030** -0.354*** -0.126 -0.594** 
  (0.02) (0.01) -0.07 (0.15) (0.22) 
Observations 2173 2043 2043 510 510 
ll -2576.723 -911.858 
  
  
aic 5163.446 1835.715 . . . 
R-squared 0.349 0.851 0.87 0.796 0.882 
            
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.Robust standard errors within parantheses.  
    
31 
 
 
The first basic model presented in the table includes only the four V-Dem main predictor 
variables measuring inequality and calculates that three of them are statistically significant 
predictors of electoral misconduct at .001 level. Model 2 augments the original by including 
in vector X a lag with one election of the dependent variable Electoral misconduct. By 
comparing the two models I test for two different theoretical assumptions – while the first 
model will predict how one unit change in the variables for inequality affects the dependent 
variable, the addition of the levels of electoral misconduct in the previous elections will test 
whether the change of occurrence of electoral fraud from one year to another is influenced 
by inequality. The lag of the dependent variable is also improving the model in 
methodological terms (e.g. serves as a proxy for omitted variables). The regression results 
in Model 2 support the hypothesis that the changes in the levels of electoral misconduct are 
explained by the variables measuring inequality based on social groups (Power distributed 
by social group and Civil liberties equality by social group). 
 
I re-estimate the obtained results in Model 3 by including country fixed effects19  in order to 
analyse the impact of the explanatory variables over time by controlling for constant 
country characteristics, and adjusting the standard errors with PCSE. The regression results 
only in a modification to the values of the beta coefficients without changing either the 
directions or the levels of significance in comparison to Model 2. The findings are thus 
robust so far. 
 
Model 4 adds all control variables derived from the theoretical review as alternative 
explanations to my main arguments20, and applies the method of panel-corrected standard 
errors (PCSE). It is interesting to note that Model 4 does not show statistically significant 
results for any of the main independent variables. The statistical significance returns in the 
last model (Model 5) which applies country fixed effects with country dummies, used to 
                                                        
19 Conducting Hausman test to decide between fixed or random effects produced results advising to use the 
first one as the null hypothesis that the error terms are not correlated with the regressors was rejected 
(Greene 2008, Chapter 9). 
20 Table A.6 in the Appendix presents the regression results when the control variables are added step by step 
without PCSE method and country fixed effects. 
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isolate the time-invariant country effects, as well as all main explanatory and control 
variables included on the right hand side of the equation. That change of the significance 
levels can be explained with large variance of the observations in the variables across 
countries which do not allow getting significant results in Model 4. The isolation of country-
specific characteristics, however, tests the effect of the independent variables on the 
outcome variable within country. The substantive implication from these results is that the 
significant results obtained are valid at country level. In other words, this means that higher 
levels of inequality in country X than in country Y is not associated with the variation in 
levels of electoral misconduct that these two countries display. Yet, a change from higher to 
lower inequality within country X over time significantly affects and lowers the frequency 
of electoral misconduct in that country. This is exactly the type of substantive effects the 
theory predicted. 
 
The most important implications of the regression estimates are the following: two 
variables for social inequality – political power distributed by social groups and social group 
equality in respect for civil rights, are statistically significant at level .001 in the last model, 
which introduces country fixed effects and the method PCSE. One unit change in the two 
explanatory variables leads to increase in the levels of “freedom and fairness” of elections of 
.382 and .363 respectively. The produced change is noteworthy since the variation scores in 
the dependent variable are between -2.2 and 2.4 (Table 2). These findings support the 
hypotheses, thus suggesting a strong and positive relationship between electoral 
misconduct and fraud. Hypothesis 4 Instances of electoral misconduct are more frequent in 
societies with inequality based on social group, is corroborated. 
 
However, the two variables with emphasis on socioeconomic position do not hold statistical 
significance persistently across the models; and in different models have an opposite 
(negative) sign to the one we expected. This means that as their values increase which 
marks more equality, the level of fraud grows too, unlike what we predicted in the previous 
sections. The effect of both variables is also quantitatively small with a coefficient of only -
.002 in the last model. Therefore, hypothesis 3 Instances of electoral misconduct are more 
frequent in societies with inequality based on socio-economic position, is rejected. 
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R-squared, presented in Table 3, tells us that for the first model 35% of the variation in 
electoral misconduct is explained by the five V-Dem variables for inequality. The 
introduction of the LDV adds 50% to the explanatory power of the model, which means that 
its inclusion serves as a proxy for the omitted variables as expected. The following models 
maintain the percent of explained variance very high with values around 80%, which can be 
considered as very substantial. 
 
In conclusion, the regression estimates show that inequality based on social differences 
increases the likelihood of electoral manipulations. This means that, for example, when one 
religious group holds in practice the monopoly of political power, actors will be more likely 
to engage in unfair tactics. The same is true, when certain social groups are denied civil 
rights, for example if the freedom of movement is restricted for a certain ethno-linguistic 
group. However, the empirical tests do not support the assumption that economic 
inequality leads to more instances of electoral misconduct.  
4.1.1 Robustness checks 
The comparison of my theory with alternative explanations shows that three of the control 
variables Gini coefficient, GDP per capita and ethnic fractionalization, do not show 
statistically significant estimates consistently through the models and produce 
quantitatively small effect on the dependent variable. The variable for ethnic 
fractionalization is omitted in the regression models introducing country dummies because 
that measure is constant over time, and therefore, is collinear with the fixed effects. Gini 
coefficient is statistically significant in the last model at .5 level but has a negative sign, 
opposite to my theory. That result in practice shows that a wide income gap between rich 
and poor is not enough to trigger greater likelihood to rig elections. 
 
The variable for type of electoral system, however, receives significant results in models 4 
and 5. The regression estimates show that moving from a majoritarian electoral system (re-
coded as 1) to a mixed one (re-coded as 2), and finally to a proportional (re-coded as 3) 
increases the overall score for “clean” elections with .188 point estimates for each step 
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(Model 5). It is worth noting that obtaining statistically significant results for some of the 
control variables, previously tested in the literature, is in practice strengthening the results 
from my analysis for two main reasons. First, because despite the strong effect of electoral 
institutions on electoral competitors’ behaviour, two of my main explanatory variables 
maintain significant results. Second, the claim for validity of the data and the new measure 
created for electoral misconduct is thus supported. 
The regime type in a state is the last alternative explanation controlled for. Excluding full 
autocracies and democracies from the analysis keeps essentially the results obtained so far 
(Table 4 below). As in the other control models, the beta coefficients are slightly changed. 
The variable Political power distributed by socio-economic position is showing statistically 
significant results in the first three models. Nevertheless, since in the other main and 
control models this variable has very high standard errors compared to the beta 
coefficients, I do not have enough evidence to claim that it has a consistent and independent 
effect on electoral misconduct. 
Another important aspect of the regression results is that the number of observations 
included in the regression drops drastically with the inclusion of the control variables21. 
This makes it difficult to compare the first models with the rest since N is decreased more 
than four times (from 2148 to 510).  The drop is explained by the fact that the control 
variables are missing information for the early years of the 20th century, and some 
countries (for example Malaysia) included in the V-Dem data collection are not coded for 
some of the control variables.  
To make sure the results I have obtained are not biased by the countries included in the last 
models, I re-estimated the first three models on the same 510 observations as in the last 
ones (Table A.8 in the appendix).  Since the regression estimates are not differing 
substantially from the initial models in terms of beta coefficients and significance levels, we 
can in all likelihood rule out that there is bias as result of the decrease of the number of 
observations. 
                                                        
21 Table A.10 in the Appendix lists the countries included in regression Models 4 and 5. 
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To further compare the regression models with and without the control variables, I perform 
likelihood ratio and Wald tests22. Both tests estimate that adding the four control measures 
as predictor variables results in a statistically significant improvement in the fit of the 
model and do not create bias (Chen 2003, Chapter 3). The output of the tests is in the 
Appendix, Table A.9. 
Table A.7 in the Appendix presents the regression estimates when the predictor variables 
are lagged with one year to test for the theory that the decision to employ fraud is 
influenced largely by the information for inequality from the year before the elections were 
                                                        
22 The two tests are used to evaluate the difference in the fit of models to data. This is done by nesting one of 
the models in the second by forcing restrictions on the parameters to make them match in terms of 
observations number. The tests then answer the question whether the restriction to those parameters 
significantly reduces the fit of the model to the data (Chen, 2003, Chapter 3). 
Table 4. Regression estimates of the effect of Societal Inequality on Electoral Misconduct 
 excluding full democracies and autocracies 
    
  
  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  V-Dem IV LDV 
LDV 
PCSE FE 
LDV, CV, 
PCSE 
LDV, CV, 
PCSE, FE 
Power distributed by socioeconomic position 0.231*** 0.096** 0.152** 0.068 -0.017 
  (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
Power distributed by social group 0.496*** 0.189*** 0.301*** 0.052 0.318** 
  (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) 
Social group equality in respect for civil liberties 0.038 -0.005 0.195*** 0.008 0.418*** 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) 
Social class equality in respect for civil liberty  0.117* 0.05 0.165* 0.068 -0.037 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.16) 
Electoral misconduct lagged 
 
0.717*** 0.381*** 0.631*** 0.248*** 
  
 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
   
0.139 . 
  
   
(0.09) . 
Gini coefficient 
   
0 -0.009 
  
   
(0) (0.01) 
GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant International USD) 
   
0.000** 0 
  
   
(0) (0) 
Electoral system 
   
0.094** 0.217** 
  
   
(0.03) (0.07) 
Constant -0.273*** -0.03 -0.284 -0.225 -0.191 
  (0.05) (0.03) (0.22) (0.21) (0.32) 
Observations 662 642 642 293 293 
ll -699.03 -382.84 
  
  
aic 1408.07 777.67 . . . 
r2 0.287 0.718 0.815 0.695 0.822 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.Robust standard errors within parantheses.  
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held. Methodologically, the lagging of the explanatory variables is a suitable check for 
reversed causality. The regression estimates show that the lag of the independent variables 
does not change the regression estimates considerably. The beta coefficients have slightly 
lower values compared to the main models, but the two variables for social inequality 
remain statistically significant at .001 level. The same results are obtained when the lag of 
the dependent variable on the right hand side of the equation is excluded (Table A.7). 
 
How good the applied models are depends also on how well they predict the outcome 
variable. The scatter plot of the observed versus the predicted values of electoral 
misconduct shows that the last model (Model 6) is good at predicting the occurrence of 
electoral misconduct, judging by the visible 45 degree distribution pattern of the 
observations (Chen et al, 2003, Chapter 2).23 Furthermore, to estimate the goodness of the 
models, I performed checks for the normality of the residuals. The plots in Graphs A.3-5 in 
the Appendix show the goodness of fit of the data when all my independent variables are 
included. Ideally, the residuals should be normally distributed in a bell-shape form in Graph 
A.3, and be plotted straight on the lines in Graphs A.4 and A.5. Despite the visible deviations, 
it can be concluded that the residuals are close to normal, and the assumed PCSE method 
has solved any occurring issues (Chen 2003, Chapter 2). The same is true for the 
assumption for homogeneity of the residuals variance. The plot of residuals against the 
predicted values (Graph A.6) shows a pattern which would not be the case in a perfectly fit 
model. However, it does not give strong enough evidence to disregard the model, especially 
because of the specifications added to the original model. 
 
Finally, I checked for observations with extreme values in my data that might have affected 
the regression line unproportionally. Table A.11 presents the nine cases estimated to be 
outliers with excessive influence. To identify unusual observations I performed standard 
checks24 for outliers (observations with large residuals), high leverage (data points with 
extreme observations on the independent variables), and finally, observations with 
                                                        
23 Plotting the predicted values from the other models showed similar results. 
24The checks flagged observations with  absolute value of the studentized residuals higher than 2; data points with leverage higher than (2k + 
2)/n, where k is the number of independent variables, and n is the number of observations in total. I also included two tests combining 
information for the residuals and leverage: Cook’s distance with a cut-off point for observations higher than 4/n, and DFITS cut-off point is for 
observation with absolute value higher than 2*sqrt(k/n) (Chen et al 2003, Chapter 2). 
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extraordinary influence on the results, and test if the removal of them changes the 
regression line substantially. However, as Table A.12 in the Appendix shows re-estimating 
the main regression models excluding the nine extreme observations did not change the 
results significantly so we can draw the conclusion that the regression coefficients are not 
driven by unusual observations.  
4.2 Discussing linearity vs. inverted “U” effect 
Up to this point in the empirical analysis we have only investigated linear relationships 
between the explanatory and outcome variables. In order to test Hypothesis 2, predicting a 
relationship that looks like an inverted “U” I used a quadratic specification for the main 
explanatory variables measuring inequality. Table 4 presents the result of the regression 
estimates. 
The coefficients on the squared specifications are not robust in the model introducing all 
control variables, country dummies and PCSE method, suggesting there is no evidence for 
inverted “U” relationship. 
Table 5. Regression estimates testing curve-linear relationship between societal 
inequality and electoral misconduct 
  Model 11 Model 12 
  V-Dem IV, FE, PCSE All IV, FE, PCSE 
Electoral misconduct lagged 0.698*** 0.275*** 
  (0.03) (0.06) 
Power distributed by socioeconomic position -0.041 -0.014 
  (0.02) (0.09) 
Power distributed by social group 0.191*** 0.371* 
  (0.03) (0.15) 
Social group equality in respect for civil liberties 0.125*** 0.401*** 
  (0.02) (0.11) 
Social class equality in respect for civil liberty  0.043 0.003 
  (0.03) (0.16) 
Power distributed by socioeconomic position, squared 0.027 0.013 
  (0.02) (0.05) 
Power distributed by social group, squared 0.060* 0.005 
  (0.05) (0.08) 
Social group equality in respect for civil liberties, squared 0.042* -0.084 
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  (0.05) (0.06) 
Social class equality in respect for civil liberty , squared -0.027 -0.003 
  (0.02) (0.06) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
-1.858*** 
  
 
(0.46) 
Gini coefficient 
 
(0.011** 
  
 
(0) 
GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant International USD) 
 
0.000*** 
  
 
(0) 
Electoral system 
 
0.191*** 
  
 
(0.05) 
Constant                            -0.380*** -0.368 
                             (0.07)                        (0.23) 
R squared 0.872 0.883 
Observations 2043 510 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.Robust standard errors within parentheses. 
Graph 3 helps to visualize the effect of inequality on electoral misconduct, presenting the 
predicted values for the dependent variable at different levels of one of the robust variables 
measuring inequality – namely, political power distributed by social groups, while the other 
variables are held at their mean25. The graphs on the left present the linear terms, and on 
the right – the quadratic terms, both are contrasted with 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Graph 2. Fitted values of electoral misconduct plotted at different levels of Power distributed 
by social group. 
 Linear specification   Quadratic specification 
 
                                                        
25 A similar comparison is used in Ansell and Samuels to investigate linearity of the relationship between 
economic inequality and the probability for democratic transition (2010). 
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My theory predicted that countries with middle levels of inequality have the highest levels 
of electoral misconduct, while full democracies and autocracies should have comparatively 
lower levels. However, the graphs show that the predicted probability for “cleanest” 
elections increases when the political power distribution improves in terms of becoming 
more inclusive for social groups. Thus, at the highest level of the explanatory variable – 
point estimate 2, marking that social group distinctions are not relevant to the political life, 
the overall quality of elections is estimated to be very high. Notice also that the confidence 
intervals are narrower in the linear specification. An explanation for the latter is that the 
inclusion of the squared terms has increased the value of the standard errors.26 
 
In sum, the empirical tests conducted support the idea that societal inequality has a 
independent powerful effect on electoral behavior and the decision to engage in fraudalent 
tactics as levels of inequality changes within countries over time. These findings 
corraborate Hypothesis 1, introduced in this paper, suggesting a positive relationship 
between inequality and electoral misconduct, and reject Hypothesis 2, arguing for a curve-
linear relationship. Regardless of other country-specific conditions,  more often than not, 
different types of electoral manipulations are employed in states in which social group 
distinctions define the political power distribution and civil liberties access, in conjunction 
with the prediction of Hypothesis 4. 
4.3 Limitations 
To test my theoretical assumptions I developed a quantitative study using statistical 
methods to analyze data with a large number of observations. This design allows estimating 
the average effect of a set of factors on a phenomenon that we want to explain. The key 
advantage of using statistical analysis is that its robustness will not be dramatically 
influenced by omitting minor variables, modest changes in the population or if not every 
                                                        
26Graph A.7 in the Appendix presents the predicted values for electoral misconduct at different levels of the other 
robust explanatory variable – civil liberties equality by social group. Again we find no evidence of an inverted U 
relationship, but for a linear one. 
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included case is explained (Mahoney, Goertz, 2006:236). In practice this means that the 
research design of large-N quantitative studies allows generalizing the reached conclusions 
for big geographical and time span. 
 
In statistical analysis all observations are equal, since the overall pattern of fit is important. 
However, the main disadvantage of this design is that substantively important cases or 
cases that do not follow the general pattern are not given special attention unlike in 
qualitative research (ibid: 231). For this reason findings from qualitative studies tend to be 
more revealing when moving from a big subset to a particular case.  
 
Mixed research designs combine the mentioned advantages of quantitative and qualitative 
methods. My research could be supplemented with qualitative case studies in a particular 
country that fits my theoretical assumption, and one that does not. Analysing and 
comparing the historical background and changes of the levels of the main variables in the 
two countries could help illustrate the logic behind the theory developed in this thesis. 
However, due to time constraints, I was not able to include such analysis in my thesis. 
5 Conclusion 
Using the newly collected V-Dem data on democracy for 139 countries in the world starting 
from 1900 until 2012, this thesis evaluates the effect societal inequality has on the 
occurrence of electoral misconduct.  The advantages of that new data allowed designing 
new single measure that encompasses various legal and illegal tactics attempted to distort 
the outcome of elections. By using multivariate framework for the explanatory variable, the 
study explores also what type of inequality aggravates the situation the most.  
 
Both societal inequality and cheating in elections remain topical development and 
governance problems in many countries. It is intuitive that electoral misconduct is 
corroding democracy as it is stealing the purpose of elections by replacing the will of the 
people. The less obvious relationship discussed in this thesis is drawing attention on how 
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societal inequality can hinder or undermine the democratic development in a country by 
affecting one of the key tools of democracy – elections. 
 
The empirical findings from this paper suggest that more often than not, inequality based 
on social group differences is associated with electoral misconduct unlike inequality based 
on economic grounds. To understand the findings better, it is worth repeating that social 
group is defined as a group of individuals that identify themselves as having common 
ethnicity, caste, language, race, religion etc., and based on this characteristic distinguish 
themselves from the other members of the society.  
 
When compared to previous research done on the topic, my results corrobarote and extend 
further the findings from the single case study on Germany done by Ziblatt (2009) 
suggesting that structural factors can hinder the transformative effect elections have on 
institutions. Put in the perspective of the larger topic about democracy and redistribution, 
my results correspond more to Ansell and Samuels’ (2010) skepticism, rather than the 
findings of Boix (2003), Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) who argue that economic equality 
as such brings about better environment for democratic transition. The essential inference 
from my analysis is that indeed equality matters for democracy, but its effect is corrosive 
only when the underlying differences are translated into the political life or affect the 
distribution of civil liberties. 
 
Analyzing and understanding the effect economic, social and political inequality can have on 
electoral manipulations has a number of practical implications too.  First, predicting ballot-
rigging, election violence and other forms of electoral irregularities can inform policies of 
international organizations, NGOs and other relevant actors on how to build strategies to 
prevent them. Second, the theoretical views presented in this paper underline why the 
different forms of inequality can be dangerous to societies’ development and should be 
addressed. In essence, failing to mitigate the inequality gaps can create a polarized society 
prepared to break the norms in order to defend their interests better. This perspective on 
the reasons for fraud, calls for focusing the attention on the long-term trends in a society’s 
development since it argues that immediate tactics employed in a specific election are 
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largely influenced by  preexisting societal power distribution differences. Therefore, 
attempts to democratize institutionally can be undermined by the conflicting interests of 
different groups. Examining further how these interests exhibit themselves in the process of 
democratization promises to be an important and interesting topic for future research.
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Appendix: 
Graphs: 
 
Graph A.1. Distribution of the observations of electoral misconduct 
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Graph A.2. Scatter plot of the dependent variable versus the predicted values for the 
dependent variable in Model 8 
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Graph A.3 Density plot of the residuals 
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Graph A.4 Standardized normal probability (P-p) plot 
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Graph A.5 Standardized quantile plot 
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Graph A.6 Plot of the residuals against the predicted values 
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Graph A.7 Fitted values of electoral misconduct on different levels of Social group 
equality in respect for civil liberties. 
 Linear specification   Quadratic specification 
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Tables: 
Table A.1. Factor analysis output 
Factor analysis/correlation                          Number of observations    =     2453 
Method: principal factors                         Retained factors =        1 
Rotation: (unrotated)                           Number of parameters =       10 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Factor     Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Factor1        4.65125      3.55422            0.8337       0.8337 
Factor2        1.09703      0.73841            0.1966       1.0303 
Factor3        0.35862      0.30502            0.0643       1.0945 
Factor4        0.05359      0.09108            0.0096       1.1042 
Factor5       -0.03749      0.01097           -0.0067       1.0974 
Factor6       -0.04846      0.02183           -0.0087       1.0888 
Factor7       -0.07029      0.05166           -0.0126       1.0762 
Factor8       -0.12195      0.00969           -0.0219       1.0543 
Factor9       -0.13164      0.03965           -0.0236       1.0307 
Factor10     -0.17129            .                   -0.0307       1.0000 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(45) = 1.5e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 --------------------------------------- 
  Variable    Factor1     Uniqueness  
----------------------------------- 
  Elections free and fair     0.8784       0.2284   
Free campaign media     0.5806       0.6629   
Government intimidation     0.8182       0.3306   
Other voting irregularities     0.7579       0.4255   
Elections multiparty     0.7325       0.4635   
Other electoral violence     0.4957       0.7543   
Election voter registry     0.7113       0.4940   
Eligibility restricted     0.1812       0.9672   
Election vote-buying     0.5688       0.6765   
EMB autonomy restricted     0.8088       0.3459   
--------------------------------------- 
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Table A. 2. List of countries included in the analysis 
1 Afghanistan 41 El Salvador 81 Mauritania 121 Taiwan 
2 Albania 42 Estonia 82 Mexico 122 Tajikistan 
3 Algeria 43 Ethiopia 83 Moldova 123 Tanzania 
4 Angola 44 Finland 84 Mongolia 124 Thailand 
5 Argentina 45 France 85 Montenegro 125 Togo 
6 Armenia 46 Gabon 86 Morocco 126 Trinidad and Tobago 
7 Australia 47 Gambia 87 Mozambique 127 Tunisia 
8 Austria 48 Georgia 88 Namibia 128 Turkey 
9 Azerbaijan 49 Germany 89 Nepal 129 Turkmenistan 
10 Belarus 50 Ghana 90 Netherlands 130 Uganda 
11 Belgium 51 Greece 91 New Zealand 131 Ukraine 
12 Benin 52 Guinea 92 Nicaragua 132 United Kingdom 
13 Bhutan 53 Guinea-Bissau 93 Niger 133 Uruguay 
14 Bolivia 54 Haiti 94 Nigeria 134 Uzbekistan 
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 55 Honduras 95 Norway 135 Venezuela 
16 Botswana 56 Hungary 96 Pakistan 136 Vietnam, DR 
17 Brazil 57 India 97 Palestine/Gaza 137 Vietnam, Republic of 
18 Bulgaria 58 Indonesia 98 Palestine/West Bank 138 Zambia 
19 Burkina Faso 59 Iran 99 Panama 139 Zimbabwe 
20 Burma/Myanmar 60 Ireland 100 Peru 
21 Burundi 61 Italy 101 Philippines 
22 Cambodia 62 Ivory Coast 102 Poland 
23 Cameroon 63 Jamaica 103 Portugal 
24 Canada 64 Japan 104 Romania 
25 Cape Verde 65 Jordan 105 Russia 
26 Central African Republic 66 Kazakhstan 106 Rwanda 
27 Chad 67 Kenya 107 Sao Tome and Principe 
28 Chile 68 Korea, South 108 Senegal 
29 Colombia 69 Kyrgyzstan 109 Serbia 
30 Comoros 70 Laos 110 Sierra Leone 
31 Congo, DR 71 Latvia 111 Slovakia 
32 Congo, Rep. of the 72 Lebanon 112 Somalia 
33 Costa Rica 73 Lesotho 113 Somaliland 
34 Croatia 74 Liberia 114 South Africa 
35 Czech Republic 75 Libya 115 Spain 
36 Denmark 76 Lithuania 116 Sri Lanka 
37 Djibouti 77 Macedonia 117 Sudan 
38 Dominican Republic 78 Madagascar 118 Swaziland 
39 Ecuador 79 Malaysia 119 Switzerland 
40 Egypt 80 Mali 120 Syria 
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Table A.3. Descriptive statistics: Electoral misconduct 
Observations 2453 
Sum of Wgt. 2453 
Mean 0.08 
Std. Dev. 0.96 
Variance 0.92 
Skewness -0.18 
Kurtosis 1.91 
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Table A.4. Pearson correlation coefficients (*p<0,5) 
  
Electoral 
misconduct 
 Social class 
equality in 
respect for 
civil liberty 
Social group equality in 
respect for civil liberties 
Power distributed 
by socioeconomic 
position 
Power 
distributed 
by social 
group 
Ethnic 
fractionalization 
Electoral misconduct 1           
 Social class equality in respect for civil 
liberty 
0.4838*   1         
  0           
Social group equality in respect for 
civil liberties 
0.5166*   0.7556*   1       
  0 0         
Power distributed by socioeconomic 
position 
0.4468*   0.7054*    0.5967*   1     
  0 0 0       
Power distributed by social group 0.5083*   0.6150*   0.5783*   0.6169*   1   
  0 0 0 0     
Ethnic fractionalization -0.2710* -0.3312* -0.2973* -0.2920* -0.3910* 1 
  0 0 0 0 0   
Gini Coefficient -0.0849 -0.1034* -0.0202 -0.0635* -0.0890* 0.3715* 
  0.0004 0 0.4031 0.0092 0.0003 0 
 GDP per Capita, PPP  0.5633*   0.4392*   0.4497*   0.4182*   0.4090*  -0.5195* 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Freedom House/Imputed Polity 0.8837*   0.4451*   0.4757*    0.4339*   0.6072*  -0.3716* 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Electoral system 0.3984*   0.2377*   0.2040*    0.1208*   0.3261*  -0.1730* 
  0 0 0 0 0 0 
              
  
Gini 
coefficient 
 GDP per 
Capita, PPP  
Freedom 
House/Imputed Polity 
Electoral system     
Gini coefficient 1           
 GDP per Capita, PPP  -0.5216* 1         
  0           
Freedom House/Imputed Polity -0.2625*  0.6002* 1       
  0 0         
Electoral system -0.1730*  0.2973* 0.4147* 1     
  0 0 0       
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Table A.5. Multicollinearity check for the Independent variables 
Variable  name VIF 1/VIF 
Civil liberties equality for social groups 3.51 0.28 
Civil liberties equality for social class 3.44 0.29 
Electoral misconduct lagged 3.19 0.31 
GDP/PPP 2.65 0.38 
Political power by social group 2.19 0.46 
Gini coefficient 1.77 0.57 
Political power by socioeconomic position 1.72 0.58 
Ethnic fractionalization 1.51 0.66 
Electoral system 1.37 0.73 
Mean VIF 2.42 
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Table A.6 Regression estimates step by step addition of the control variables 
  Adding Adding Adding Adding 
  
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Gini 
coefficient 
Electoral 
system 
GDP per 
capita 
Electoral misconduct lagged 0.825*** 0.837*** 0.694*** 0.680*** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) 
Power distributed by socioeconomic position 0.047 0.050* 0.044 0.029 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Power distributed by social group 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.111 0.067 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
Social group equality in respect for civil liberties 0.063** 0.035 0.043 0.069 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) 
Social class equality in respect for civil liberty  0.008 0.016 0.085* 0.044 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) 
Ethnic fractionalization 0.004 0.018 -0.047 0.016 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
Gini coefficient 
 
0.001 0 0.001 
  
 
(0) (0) (0) 
Electoral system 
  
0.065*** 0.068** 
  
  
(0.02) (0.02) 
GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant International USD) 
   
0.000 
  
   
0 
Constant -0.103*** -0.107* -0.067 -0.126 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.16) 
N 1426 1185 756 510 
ll -735.998 -540.416 -302.715 -198.058 
aic 1485.997 1096.833 623.43 416.116 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.Robust standard errors within parentheses. 
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Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.Robust standard errors within parantheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A.7 Regression re-estimations, lagged independent variables;  no lag on the dependent 
variable.  
  
Lagged V-
Dem 
variables 
LDV, lagged 
independent 
vars 
Lagged 
independent 
and control 
variables, 
PCSE, FE   
No lag on the 
DV, Control 
variables, 
PCSE, FE 
Electoral misconduct, lagged 
 
0.905*** 0.310*** 
 
  
  
 
(0.01) (0.08) 
 
  
Power distributed by socioeconomic position 0.136*** 0.011 0.081 
 
0.072 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) 
 
(0.06) 
Power distributed by social group 0.329*** 0.008 0.357** 
 
0.509*** 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.12) 
 
(0.09) 
Social group equality in respect for civil liberties 0.265*** 0.019 0.497*** 
 
0.477*** 
  (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) 
 
(0.09) 
Social class equality in respect for civil liberty  0.064 0.034 -0.009 
 
-0.026 
  (0.04) (0.02) (0.1) 
 
(0.13) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
  
. 
 
. 
  
  
. 
 
. 
Gini coefficient 
  
-0.007 
 
-0.010* 
  
  
(0.01) 
 
(0) 
GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant International USD) 
  
0 
 
0 
Electoral system 
  
                 0.052 
 
(0) 
 
0.222*** 
0.05 
   
0.06                  
 
  
Constant -0.219*** 0.011 -0.190   -0.959*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.28) 
 
(0.21) 
Observations 2067 2040 458 
 
516 
ll -2511.918 -952.522 
  
  
aic 5033.837 1917.043 .   . 
 
     . 
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Table A.8. Re-estimating models 1-3 on the sub-sample of countries 
  
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 3 
  V-Dem  LDV 
LDV, PCSE, 
FE 
Power distributed by socioeconomic position 0.111* 0.022 -0.009 
  (0.056) (0.038) (0.063) 
Power distributed by social group 0.403*** 0.105 0.397*** 
  (0.086) (0.061) (0.095) 
Social group equality in respect for civil liberties 0.193** 0.074 0.369*** 
  (0.073) (0.049) (0.096) 
Social class equality in respect for civil liberty  0.127* 0.028 -0.005 
  (0.059) (0.047) (0.114) 
Electoral misconduct lagged 
 
0.707*** 0.290*** 
  
 
(0.048) (0.06) 
Constant -0.057 0.04 -0.2 
  (0.066) (0.044) (0.121) 
  
  
  
Observations 510 510 510 
ll 
-
407.575 
-
201.713   
aic 827.149 417.425 . 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.Robust standard errors within parantheses. 
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Table A.9. Comparing the regression results between the 
nested models 
Likelihood ratio test results: 
. lrtest n1 n2 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(3)  =     28.68 
(Assumption: n1 nested in n2)                         Prob> chi2 =    0.0000 
 
Wald test output 
. test al_ethnicginiwdi_gdpcgol_est_fill 
 ( 1)  o.al_ethnic = 0 
 ( 2)  gini = 0 
 ( 3)  wdi_gdpc = 0 
 ( 4)  gol_est_fill = 0 
Constraint 1 dropped 
F(  3,   426) =    8.35 
Prob> F =    0.0000 
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Table A.10 List of countries included in Models 4 and 5 
1 Albania  31 Ireland  61 Switzerland 
2 Argentina  32 Italy  62 Thailand  
3 Armenia 33 Kenya  63 Trinidad and Tobago  
4 Australia 34 Korea, South 64 Turkey  
5 Austria 35 Kyrgyzstan  65 Uganda 
6 Belgium  36 Laos 66 Ukraine  
7 Benin  37 Latvia  67 United Kingdom  
8 Bolivia 38 Lebanon  68 Venezuela 
9 Brazil 39 Lithuania  
  
10 Bulgaria  40 Macedonia 
  
11 Burundi 41 Madagascar  
  
12 Cape Verde  42 Mali 
  
13 Central African Republic  43 Mauritania  
  
14 Comoros 44 Moldova 
  
15 Congo, Republic of the 45 Mongolia  
  
16 Croatia  46 Nepal  
  
17 Czech Republic  47 Nicaragua  
  
18 Denmark  48 Niger  
  
19 El Salvador  49 Nigeria  
  
20 Estonia  50 Pakistan  
  
21 Finland  51 Peru  
  
22 France  52 Philippines 
  
23 Georgia 53 Poland  
  
24 Ghana  54 Portugal 
  
25 Greece 55  Senegal 
  
26 Guinea-Bissau  56  Sierra Leone  
  
27 Honduras  57 Slovakia  
  
28 Hungary  58 Spain  
  
29 India  59 Sri Lanka  
  
30 Indonesia  60 Sudan 
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Table A.11 List of outliers and influential observations by country and 
election year 
Country name Year 
Studentized 
residuals 
Leverage 
value 
Cook's distance Dfit 
            
Threshold value   absolute(r)> 2 >(2k+2)/n > 4/n 
absolute(Dfit)> 
2*sqrt(k/n) 
            
Lebanon 1992 -2.59 0.05 0.03 -0.59 
Sudan 1996 -2.59 0.07 0.04 -0.71 
Benin 2011 -2.51 0.05 0.03 -0.58 
Pakistan 1985 -2.08 0.06 0.02 -0.51 
Lebanon 2000 2.89 0.05 0.04 0.66 
Burundi 1993 3.49 0.05 0.05 0.80 
Sierra Leone 1996 3.75 0.08 0.09 1.08 
Hungary 1990 4.15 0.06 0.08 1.01 
Mauritania 2006 5.46 0.06 0.15 1.36 
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Table A.12 Regression re-estimation Model 1-5 on the effect on Societal inequality on 
Electoral misconduct without outliers and influential observations 
  
V-Dem 
IV 
LDV LDV PCSE FE LDV, CV, PCSE LDV, CV, PCSE, FE 
Power distributed by socioeconomic position 0.074* -0.01 -0.051* -0.033 -0.033 
Power distributed by social group 0.365*** 0.094*** 0.186*** 0.106*          0.235**    
Social group equality in respect for civil liberties 0.229*** 0.037* 0.129*** 0.001  0.209**    
Social class equality in respect for civil liberty  -0.008 0.004 0.032 0.064*         0.15 
Electoral misconduct lagged 
 
0.877*** 0.737*** 0.736***        0.370***   
Ethnic fractionalization 
   
0.048   (omitted)      
Gini coefficient 
   
0.001 -0.010*     
GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant International USD) 
   
0.038*          0.139**    
Electoral system 
   
0.000*         0 
Constant 
-
0.247*** -0.031** -0.315*** -0.476 -0.372 
  
    
  
Observations 2141 2012 2012 493 493 
ll -2499.0 -841.6 
  
  
chi2 
  
514.8 2483.3 478.9 
aic 5010.0 1697.2 . .               . 
 
Legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
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List of indicators used in the analysis: 
 
Indicators included in the measure for electoral misconduct (V-Dem data: Coppedge et al, 2013): 
 
1. Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (B)   
v2 tag:  v2elrstrct 
Project manager:  Pamela Paxton 
Question:  Is the eligibility of candidates for national executive or legislative office formally restricted (by 
constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?  
Responses:   
0:  Yes, there are such statutory restrictions. 
1:  No, but law requires that candidates must renounce (or hide) their ethnic, racial, religious, or linguistic 
identity. 
2:  No, there are no such restrictions. 
Scale:  Ordinal 
2. EMB autonomy (C) 
v2 tag:  v2elembaut 
Project manager:  Staffan I. Lindberg 
Question:  Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and 
administrative rules impartially in national elections?  
Clarification:  The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections. 
Responses:   
0:  No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body. 
1:  Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the 
outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the de facto ruling body. 
2:  Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this 
influences the outcome of the election. 
3:  Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de 
facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections. 
4:  Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
 
3. Elections multiparty (C)  
v2 tag:  v2elmulpar 
Project manager:  Staffan I. Lindberg 
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Question:  Was this national election multiparty? 
Responses:   
0:  No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few 
parties are legal but they are all de facto controlled by the dominant party). 
1:  Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party 
and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency. 
2:  Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained 
– legally or informally. 
3:  Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or 
de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent 
competition in a portion of the territory. 
4:  Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. 
far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties). 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
4. Election voter registry (C) 
v2 tag:  v2elrgstry 
Project manager:  Staffan I. Lindberg 
Question:  In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used? 
Responses:   
0:  No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used. 
1:  No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could 
have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and 
impersonation). 
2:  Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact 
on electoral outcomes. 
3:  Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been 
disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly. 
4:  Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it 
was applied in a reasonable fashion. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
 
5. Election vote buying (C) 
v2 tag:  v2elvotbuy 
Project manager:  Staffan I. Lindberg 
Question:  In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying? 
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Clarification:   Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small 
groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation 
targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., “porkbarrel” legislation. 
Responses:   
0:  Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties 
and candidates. 
1:  Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts 
of the country or by one or a few parties. 
2:  Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings 
were more about meeting an ‘entry-ticket’ expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, 
even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded. 
3:  Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few 
small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters. 
4:  None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
 
6. Election other voting irregularities (C)  
v2 tag:  v2elirreg 
Project manager:  Staffan I. Lindberg 
Question:  In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or 
opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?  
Clarification:  Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting 
of votes, and false collation of votes.  
This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of 
the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions). 
Responses:   
0:  Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities. 
1:  Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts 
of the country. 
2:  Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they 
were intentional or disfavored particular groups. 
3:  Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional 
or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.  
4:  None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting 
from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.  
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
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7. Election government intimidation (C) 
v2 tag:  v2elintim 
Project manager:  Staffan I. Lindberg 
Question:  In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, 
intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents? 
Clarification:  Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election 
period should not be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately). 
Responses:   
0:  Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period 
was quiet. 
1:  Yes, frequent:  There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition 
by the government or its agents during the election period. 
2:  Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated – harassment and 
intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents. 
3:  Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or 
its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of 
opposition groups.  
4:  None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the 
election campaign period and polling day. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
8. Election other electoral violence (C) 
v2 tag:  v2elpeace 
Project manager:  Staffan I. Lindberg 
Question:  In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from 
other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the 
election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)? 
Responses:   
0:  No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an 
intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of 
deaths or displaced refugees. 
1:  Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond 
limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been 
forced to move temporarily. 
2:  Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of 
the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small. 
3:  Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died 
and very few were injured. 
4:  Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred. 
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Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
9. Election free campaign media (C) 
v2 tag:  v2elfrcamp 
Project manager:  Staffan I. Lindberg 
Question:  Do parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media 
during national election periods? 
Responses:   
0:  Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access. 
1:  Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access. 
2:  All parties receive free access. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
10. Election free and fair (C) 
v2 tag:  v2elfrfair 
Project manager:  Staffan I. Lindberg 
Question:  Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, 
would you consider this national election to be free and fair?  
Clarification:  The only thing that should not be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a 
free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately). 
Responses:   
0:  No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do 
with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority).  
1:  Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the 
outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 
2:  Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also 
significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not 
(as defined above). 
3:  Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in 
the end affect the outcome (as defined above). 
4:  Yes. There was some amount or human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely 
unintentional and without significant consequences. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net).  
 
 
70 
 
Inequality indicators (V-Dem data, Coppedge et al, 2013): 
1. Power distributed by social group (C) 
v2 tag:  v2pepwrsoc 
Project manager:  John Gerring 
Question:  Is political power distributed according to social groups? 
Clarification:  A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or 
some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic 
status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. 
Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., 
as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that 
are understood - by those residing within that society – to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. 
Responses:   
0:  Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This 
monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 
1:  Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This 
monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 
2:  Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This 
monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change. 
3:  Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; 
or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for 
a period of time, followed by another – but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power. 
4:  All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, 
religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net).  
 
2. Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C) 
v2 tag:  v2pepwrses 
Project manager:  John Gerring 
Question:  Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?  
Clarification:  All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some 
societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich 
and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the 
political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income 
translates into political power.  
Responses:   
0:  Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no 
influence.  
1:  Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. 
Poorer people have essentially no influence.  
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2:  Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have 
some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people. 
3:  Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as 
much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power. 
4:  Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. 
Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net).  
3. Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (C) 
v2 tag:  v2clacjust 
Project manager:  Svend-Erik Skaaning 
Question:  Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?  
Clarification:  This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across 
socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social 
status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of 
movement, and freedom from forced labor. 
Responses:   
0:  Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people.  
1:  Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.  
2:  Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people. 
3:  Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.  
4:  Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
 
4. Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C) 
v2 tag:  v2clsocgrp 
Project manager:  Svend-Erik Skaaning 
Question:  Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the 
same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?  
Clarification:  Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of 
movement, and freedom from forced labor. 
Responses:   
0:  Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population. 
1:  Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population. 
2:  Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population. 
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3:  Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population. 
4:  Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties. 
Scale:  Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model. 
Cross-coder aggregation:  Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at 
V-Dem.net). 
 
Control variables: 
 
1. Ethnic fractionalization Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat & Wacziarg  (Alesina et al 2003)  
The definition of ethnicity involves a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics. The variables reflect 
the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not share a certain characteristic, 
the higher the number the less probability of the two sharing that characteristic. 
Years: 1946-2012  
N: 189 
Note: Country Constant Variable 
 
Dataset accessed through the Quality of Government dataset 
(http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/ 2014-03-20) 
 
2. GDP per capita, PPP (constant international $) World Bank (World Bank WDI 2013) 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to 
international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing 
power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included 
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or 
for depletion and degradation of natural resources.  
Years: 1980-2011  
N: 181  
 
Dataset accessed through the Quality of Government dataset 
(http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/ 2014-03-20) 
 
3. Gini Household Disposable Income (Solt 2008)  
Estimate of Gini index of inequality in equivalized (square root scale) household disposable income, using 
Luxembourg Income Study data as the standard.  
The Standardized World Income Inequality Database  
A custom missing-data algorithm was used to standardize the United Nations University's World Income 
Inequality Database; data collected by the Luxembourg Income Study served as the standard.  
Years: 1960-2010 
N: 169  
Dataset accessed through the Quality of Government dataset 
(http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/ 2014-03-20) 
 
Supplemented by data gathered by Ansell and Samuels (2010). 
 
4. Electoral System Type  (Bormann & Golder 2013) 
The basic type of electoral system used in the elections.  
(1) Majoritarian 
(2) Proportional  
(3) Mixed 
Years: 1946-2011 
N: 134  
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Dataset accessed through the Quality of Government dataset 
(http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/ 2014-03-20) 
 
5. Democracy (Freedom House/Imputed Polity (Hadenius & Teorell 2005) 
Scale ranges from 0-10 where 0 is least democratic and 10 most democratic. Average of Freedom House (fh_pr 
and fh_cl) is transformed to a scale 0-10 and Polity (p_polity2) is transformed to a scale 0-10. These variables 
are averaged into fh_polity2.  
The imputed version has imputed values for countries where data on Polity is missing by regressing Polity on 
the average Freedom House measure. Hadenius and Teorell (2005) show that this average index performs 
better both in terms of validity and reliability than its constituent parts.  
Years: 1972-2012 
N: 207  
Dataset accessed through the Quality of Government dataset 
(http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/ 2014-03-20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
